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Abstract 
This article contributes to debates about how capitalist corporations ‘see’, and how they 
concurrently relate to the places where they are located. It argues that an analytical focus on seeing 
illuminates how internal organization and outwards relation-making are tied together in complex 
ways. Even so, corporations of the extractive industries in particular cannot be assumed to 
encompass a single coherent view. The empirical case is a critical examination of how a gas project 
employed strict health, safety and security measures to generate order, when encountering alterity in 
an unfamiliar environment in Papua New Guinea. It reveals how the project was organized around 
two conflicting ways of seeing its host country—trying to separate itself from while simultaneously 
having to engage and provide benefits for it. 
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Anthropologists have for many years debated how institutions ‘think’ (Douglas 1986), or how 
organizations—private or public—‘see’ (e.g. Scott 1998; Ferguson 2005). In other words, what 
practices and discourses do corporate groups employ to order and categorize the world, and how do 
they act through those categories? This article contributes to this debate by analyzing how a 
capitalist corporation sees when it finds itself amidst a foreign population in an unfamiliar 
environment. It thus brings together a cultural theme of alterity with a more political economic 
theme of capitalist and corporate organization of extraction. The specific case is how the petroleum 
company ExxonMobil saw Papua New Guinea (PNG), when it organized and operated a project 
meant to extract natural gas from sites in the PNG Highlands, and how this project called the ‘PNG 
LNG Project’ (henceforth ‘the Project’) dealt with the foreign culture(s) of its host country during 
parts of its construction phase in 2010-11. All too often corporations such as ExxonMobil are 
presumed to have only one purpose (and one way of seeing) when operating their projects, namely 
profit. I will not downplay the importance of this motive in keeping such an organization together, 
but I will nonetheless argue that a shift in ethnographic gaze towards how organizations see in 
multiple and sometimes conflicting ways can help us understand how they organize themselves as 
well as interact with their surroundings. They can be ethnographic objects of study in their own 
right, and interestingly so when they face cultural alterity. 
The debate that I engage has been shaped by James Scott’s Seeing like a State (1998) and James 
Ferguson’s commentary on the same piece (2005). As I read them, Scott and Ferguson both discuss 
‘seeing’ as an essentializing, totalizing and yet simplifying vision constituted by techniques and 
ideologies (of either modernism for Scott or of modular and flexible market capitalism for 
Ferguson). In other words, seeing is a structural and organizational dynamic; an unfolding process 
of interpretation and representation, which is not reducible to any single employee’s view or 
position within the structure. Since they discuss techniques and ideologies, seeing to Scott and 
Ferguson does not imply a mutual or reciprocal gaze, however (cf. Vigh and Sausdal 2014: 67-68). 
They thus underestimate, in my opinion, how seeing is a factor in creating both a subject that sees, 
and an object, which is seen (cf. Viveiros de Castro 1998: 476-77). If seeing should work as a 
useful metaphor for the description and analysis of organizations and corporate bodies, I would 
suggest taking into account the heterogenous relations between subject and object through which 
views are composed. This harks back to the well-worn anthropological insight that cultures—
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including those of western corporations—are not singular, distinct or easily bounded. They are 
“involved in relations of alterity as a condition of their internal consistency, their status as some sort 
of entity, and their identity.” (Sahlins 2010: 103). 
A related departure from Scott and Ferguson is Marina Welker’s proposal that corporations and 
their projects should not be regarded as prior seeing subjects, and that such a subject cannot be 
understood as a singular Homo economicus. They are enacted as seeing under specific 
sociomaterial and practical circumstances. This enactment is not static or a priori reducible to just 
one type of view (Welker 2014: 80, see also Appel 2012a, 2012b). Welker’s aim is to present an 
understanding of what comprises a corporation—where it ‘begins and ends’. When focusing on 
practice, it is clear that corporations in general and extractive projects in particular are heterogenous 
assemblages of multiple actors that often have different and even conflicting agendas. It is 
misleading, then, to assume that they see in just one way, or appear as coherent agents, but their 
attempts to do so should be taken seriously (Welker 2014: 2, 217-18). While pursuing an 
anthropological contribution that resembles Welker’s, I particularly want to emphasize how the 
view(s) of the outside contributes to making an alleged coherence on the inside, and vice versa. 
That is, a focus on how corporate categories and discourses are enacted as views in practice, can 
relate the way order is created internally to the way the inside is differentiated from the outside.1 
Consequently, I analyze the Project’s work of ordering and differentiation as comprised of in this 
case two contrasting views or ways of seeing. The Project’s first view, of PNG as in need of and as 
having a potential for development, stemmed from having to comply with expectations to openness 
and the provision of benefits for both locals and the PNG state in order to be allowed to operate. 
Managers and planners in the Project headquarters proposed that the Project could help generate 
wealth and development for the Project Impacted Areas (PIAs) and PNG more generally, and that 
positive influences could ‘trickle down’ to the communities via locals employed as Project staff. 
Planning for benefits and development was the most important justification for the Project’s 
presence in PNG, and it was frequently communicated to stakeholders at all levels. This 
communication was part of the pursuit of ‘best practices’ of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and of giving free prior and informed consultation.  
The second view, of PNG as danger to be avoided, enacted a separation of personnel and facilities 
from the outside through a focus on health, safety and security (henceforth ‘HSS’). Such work of 
ordering and differentiation attempted to position the Project in PNG in a way that has been 
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categorized as ‘enclaving’ by Ferguson (2005). Even if HSS-measures partly grew out of CSR-
concerns and played an important role in fulfilling such aims, HSS also dominated the internal 
organization and the way boundaries to the outside were erected, which made enclaving easy to 
identify. In short, HSS indicated a view that presumed order to exist on the inside, and saw the 
‘disorder’ of PNG, a country which in corporate circles had a poor reputation as an unstable and 
unsafe destination, as either something that had to be made ‘legible’ and controllable through the 
ordering practices of HSS, or something uncontrollable to be bounded off also by HSS-measures.  
HSS-measures in practice thus implied a dual view of PNG and its people. On the one hand PNG 
was presented as chaotic, violent-prone and unpredictable, and therefore had to be kept at arm’s 
length. On the other hand, PNG was under other circumstances ascribed an underlying sameness 
when assuming that its people could develop and become ‘like us’ with the opportunities delivered 
by the Project. The two contrasting views thus comprised a dilemma between relating to PNG in 
order to contribute to development and justify the Project’s presence, or separating oneself from 
PNG in order to maximize profit and minimize liabilities. 
 
The petroleum project assemblage and its ‘views’ 
Social science perspectives on extractive projects have since the 1990s focused on the impact that 
these projects have on societies that host them. I will distinguish between two mainstream and one 
more critical perspective. The first mainstream perspective argues that such projects are 
opportunities for growth that will benefit host societies and stakeholders by providing employment, 
royalties and much more (see Davis and Tilton 2005). This perspective, which I here label 
‘modernist’ or ‘developmentalist’, has often provided legitimacy for the extractive industries 
operating in the Global South. It was propagated by the Project too. This perspective has, 
nonetheless, been confronted with analyses from political economists and geographers that have 
gained widespread influence. These theories aim at explaining the lack of economic growth that 
often comes with extraction in the Global South (e.g. Auty 1993; Karl 1997). Their critique is as 
much leveled at the institutional behavior of the state and the absence of its capacity to manage the 
resulting wealth. Terms such as rent-seeking, resource curse, or paradox of plenty attempt to 
explain the social, political, and economic order (or disorder) of the host states and their societies 
caused by windfall revenues. This latter perspective has itself become a way for extractive projects 
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to justify enclaving and autonomy from host societies (Appel 2012a). It thus describes a mode of 
operation embedded within neoliberal flexible capitalism, which I will follow Appel in referring to 
as ‘modular’ (ibid.). 
The two mainstream perspectives have both guided the extractive industries in planning and 
operations. Apart from being academic perspectives, they entail practical but contrasting views 
through which these projects see their host societies. It is not unproblematic to navigate between 
them since the modernist perspective stresses how extraction is beneficial and can generate and 
maintain positive relationships to states and local communities, while the modular on the contrary 
stresses the need to keep extractive activities isolated from corrupted states and disruptive 
community relations. The projects are in other words positioned between two views holding them in 
a dilemma between interaction and relation-making, and isolation and boundary-making. As 
mentioned, each of these views furthermore imply distinct perspectives on their hosts. Both views 
constructed PNG as somehow lagging behind (morally or economically), but while the modernist 
perspective is aimed at helping PNG develop, the modular perspective tries to shy away from any 
responsibility.  
A third perspective is the anthropologically oriented critiques that have highlighted the extractive 
industries embeddedness in the very making of the resource curse and the consequent societal 
disorder (e.g. Appel 2012a; Behrends et al. 2011; Rogers 2012; Watts 2004; Yessenova 2012).2 My 
own analysis follows the critical anthropological track by engaging with the processes and practices 
that stem from and form the views of such projects. This third perspective has developed through a 
dialogue with Scott’s (1998) investigation of state ‘schemes to improve the human condition’, 
where he outlined state governance as a modern way of seeing and generating knowledge about 
society and citizens. Scott argued that seeing and ordering by homogenization, standardization and 
simplification had been the modus operandi of the modern, developmental state, which he also saw 
as a driver of global capitalism. In his discussion of Scott’s book, Ferguson counters this latter 
claim by arguing that oil projects leapfrog between secured enclaves and do not interact with 
society. Instead of an entity making claims to a holistic, nationwide impact through a grid-like 
standardization, the oil industry and its capital pops in, sucks out resources, and leap-frogs to the 
next spot in a point-to-point movement that skips the territorial space in between (see also Auty 
1993). The mode of seeing stressed by Ferguson is enabled by enclaved infrastructures secluded 
through private security measures and an abdication of responsibility. What Ferguson refers to as 
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the social thickness (wages, social services and insurance for the workforce) of the African mining 
industry of a previous high modernist period has in the contemporary oil industry been replaced by 
‘thin’ social relations and a detachment from liabilities (Ferguson 2005: 379, see also Yessenova 
2012).  
Ferguson’s short piece does not really engage with the question of how the enclaving is enacted in 
practice, though. Hannah Appel’s work from Equatorial Guinea (2012a; 2012b) takes up this mantle 
by exploring the offshore as an ideal for what she refers to as the modularity of the enclaves: “the 
use of mobile, compliant, and self-contained infrastructures, labor setups, forms of expertise, and 
legal guidelines to enable offshore work in Equatorial Guinea to function ‘just like’ offshore work 
in Ghana, Brazil, or the North Sea.” (Appel 2012a: 693). The offshore is the site, where the ideal of 
separation from local entanglements can at least in theory be perfected, but the modularity is also 
often carried onshore, where it is enforced by discipline and infrastructure (Appel 2012a). 
Such research focused on the practical constitution of a project, and on the practical interaction at 
the boundaries of an enclave, reveals the many different interests and stakeholders involved in 
extraction, and how seeing is multi-facetted. The external boundaries—especially onshore—can be 
fuzzy and depend on constant work to keep out unwanted liabilities and influences, but extractive 
projects can also be quite differentiated and enacted in multiple forms internally. They are usually 
complicated assemblages of human and non-human resources brought together for limited periods 
of time through temporary rotations and time-limited contracts. The fluidity of the work force in 
particular calls for procedures that generate stability and continuity. If extraction projects are 
assembled from multiple entities and techniques, it follows that labor is needed to ensure that they 
appear as having coherent aims, intents, cultures, norms, boundaries and thus ways of seeing (cf. 
Ballard and Banks 2003). Yet even such labor of enclaving meant to ensure stability can itself be 
practiced in many different ways. A project can be enacted for instance as employer, patron, or 
partner—each potentially corresponding to a different way of seeing its outside depending on the 
professions, locations, and circumstances involved (see Welker 2014).  
Whether a project sees in one or many ways is not a productive question in itself. More important is 
what the views do, and how they are related to different sociotechnical arrangements and 
interactions (Welker 2014). I will return to examples of contradictory, unstable and conflicting 
aspects of different views below as I elaborate on the internal mechanisms of the Project and how 
its seeing was comprised of conflicting views fostered by or in response to HSS-concerns. HSS not 
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only maintained boundaries to the disorderly outside, a process aimed at ensuring profits and 
avoiding liabilities. It also helped create a degree of internal cohesion and communicated to 
stakeholders and (especially) international lenders that concerns over the Project’s contribution to 
the resource curse were being met. HSS as a view thus had a performative effect (Appel 2012b).  
In what follows, I turn to examples derived from my own experience of working for the Project as a 
stakeholder engagement consultant during 2010 and 2011 while its main infrastructure was 
constructed. This inside position gave me access to the views, how they were created, and what 
consequences they had for interaction and operations in PNG. The examples will be presented as 
differently situated viewpoints based upon sites and circumstances where the Project was located. 
First I account for the two views (modernist and modular) and the main viewpoints I encountered 
upon my arrival as an expatriate employee cocooned by the Project’s HSS-measures in PNG’s 
capital Port Moresby. From there I move to the remote extraction site and a focus on the challenges 
or spaces of contention emerging from the negotiation of boundaries between inside and outside, 
including the challenge for local employees of harboring crisscrossing and often conflicting 
loyalties.  
 
The hotel as viewpoint: separation 
The Project had commenced in 2009 and with an approximate investment of 19 billion USD during 
construction, it was one of the largest foreign investments in the history of PNG. Because of its 
size, ExxonMobil and the other equity holders of the Project had to rely on loans from international 
lenders, which forced it to adhere to the Equator Principles3 and to demands from the International 
Finance Corporation that stressed the need to address social and environmental issues. Under these 
circumstances, the Project subscribed to CSR-based policies of best practices consisting of strict 
managerial and bureaucratic rules and standards for how to assess and mitigate social and 
environmental risks. In response to the demands, community relations and stakeholder engagement 
teams were formed with a mandate to ensure that landowners4 and other stakeholders (such as local 
level governments, NGOs, and businesses) had indeed been consulted about the Project. Overall, 
the requirements formed as mentioned a basis for ways the Project saw PNG—firstly as a country 
that entailed risk and needed to be kept out, and secondly as one that the Project was obliged to help 
develop.  
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This section addresses the modular view of PNG as dangerous, and how the adherence to 
assessments, engagement, reviews and other requirements was related to the classification of PNG 
as a ‘high-risk’ country generally associated with disorder, corruption, and weak state institutions 
(e.g., Dinnen 2001). Port Moresby where the main Project headquarter was located suffered from an 
especially bad reputation, and the security risks of the city were popular conversation topics in the 
gated communities of expats (e.g. Voigt-Graf 2014). The Travel Risk Assessment form that I signed 
referred among other things to criminal gangs being behind “a persistently high number of 
indiscriminate violent break-ins, hold-ups, muggings and rapes” and that “tribal rivalries motivate 
violent crime in the countryside”. Apart from these problems, frequently mentioned issues included 
corruption (in the guise of wantok relations5), diseases ranging from malaria to HIV, and the natural 
habitat itself, with crocodiles, snakes, and much more.  
This view was communicated to Project employees in several ways through repeated inductions and 
meetings, symbols, training, tests as well as a variety of procedures and rules meant to facilitate the 
internalization of HSS as a way the individual employee should think and act. For example, we 
went through inductions prior to travel to PNG and upon every arrival at a new Project location. At 
Project camps there where were daily meetings and briefings in order to introduce the different 
groups in a camp to each other and to share problems, ideas, and knowledge of the environment in 
which their work was taking place. In Port Moresby, some of us attended a course in first aid and a 
course about how to act outside the Project boundary—referred to as ‘uncontrolled environment’. 
The course included theoretical and practical work with risk assessment exercises, safety reviews, 
and emergency response plans, which tried to identify all possible threats but also regarded any type 
of encounter and work task as a potential risk. Naturally, the work practices at the construction or 
drilling sites could benefit from such scrutiny and measures were aimed specifically at professions 
such as engineers, welders and rig operators rather than social scientists, but there were also 
guidelines for how to hold the handrail when ascending or descending ladders in office buildings.  
Apart from deliberate training, all Project premises, from Port Moresby offices to the camps, 
displayed HSS-messages repeated through slogans (‘nobody gets hurt,’ ‘look after your buddy,’ 
‘safety is everyone’s business’) and logos on posters, signboards, and Project merchandise (mugs, 
rubber bracelets, key rings). We were required to wear Project-approved ‘PPE’ (personal protective 
equipment such as long-sleeved permethrin-treated clothing to ward off insects) when going 
outdoors. When doing so, we were not allowed to move around by any means other than the cars of 
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one of the security companies; we were not permitted to go for a walk or get on a bus. Even police 
cars and hotel minibuses were considered too unsafe and insecure. Clubs and restaurants in the city 
were subject to recurrent security checks, and the most unsafe parts of the city were classified as 
no-go zones, where the security companies were not allowed to bring us. In order to facilitate our 
travel, all Project staff was assigned a call sign and a mobile phone each so we could ring the 
security dispatch, which would send us a vehicle 24-7. The most extreme example of restrictions on 
movement was that we were not allowed to walk the approximately 100 meters between the Project 
headquarter in Port Moresby and our hotel (The Crowne Plaza, jokingly renamed ‘The Crowne 
Prison’ due to our circumstances of confinement). Security thus kept employees in as much as it 
kept PNG out. The health and hygiene-measures also created isolation from the outside by listing 
the restaurants that we were permitted to visit. In terms of hygiene, rules included how to avoid 
germs by using the arm and not the hand when closing the tap after washing hands, and one 
colleague told me he had been instructed to avoid shaking hands with locals and to use the hand 
sanitizer issued by the Project if handshaking could not be avoided.  
All these HSS-precautions can be summarized as an extremely detailed discipline accentuating 
everything that PNG was not—hygienic, safe and secure. The overall austerity of HSS-discipline 
was unique compared to other projects operating in PNG, and especially newcomers thought it to be 
absurd. Yet as a mutable form, the Project needed HSS to create a shared understanding through 
discipline and socialization across the diversity and frequent rotations of employees, contractors and 
subcontractors (cf. Minnegal and Dwyer 2017: 208). While only few employees championed the 
slogans and standards, the repetitions of procedures may still have given large parts of the 
workforce a point of reference and a sense of a shared purpose, with PNG as the entity against 
which Project success and order was implicitly assessed. The abundance of communication about 
dangers and risks relied on the objectification of PNG as strange and savage, and it simultaneously 
presented what should be done to avoid its perils. HSS then served to both enact and justify the 
Project’s isolation and enclaving. Seeing PNG (as well as the work tasks of the industry) as 
entailing high-risk made the corresponding set of HSS-measures a legitimate response, although it 
is possible to see the concern with HSS as co-creator of PNG as risky and disorderly rather than a 
mere reaction (Appel 2012a).  
This boundary-making between Project premises and the non-Project outside had several 
consequences for our ability to work (how do you conduct stakeholder engagement when you are 
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confined to your office and your hotel?). The ideal of modularity in other words seemed to be a 
self-obstructing mechanism for making relations to and learning about PNG. Even more 
problematic was the boundary for Papua New Guinean employees, who lived in Port Moresby 
where affordable housing is almost impossible to find, even for middle-class professionals with fair 
salaries by local standards. Many local employees thus had to live in the no-go zones, because it 
was cheaper. However, getting to work then posed a challenge for them (cf. Appel 2012a). While 
all employees were picked up in the morning by Project vehicles driven by personnel from a 
security company, those living in a no-go zone would first have to walk or travel by public transport 
to get to a permissible pick-up point, despite the restrictions on movement that we otherwise faced. 
They thus had to hop in and out of the zone, where Project rules and responsibility would be in 
effect, which complicated the question of who could be held accountable when something 
happened. To them, HSS provided a particular contrast to an outside with different prohibitions, 
different risks, and no Project-sanctioned rules or measures offering any protection. Local 
employees were also in other ways subject to liminality. As employees they were insiders (although 
ones with much lower salaries and thus recognition as insiders), but still they needed to negotiate 
the boundaries going in and out.  
The HSS-measures displayed a view of PNG as dangerous and disorderly, which demanded strict 
boundaries between inside and outside. For the Port Moresby-based expatriate employee, these 
boundaries were well policed with point-to-point travel and a minimum of contact with outside 
elements. Around us, the enclave was relentlessly reproduced and defended, while the HSS-
measures internally comprised a set of shared practices offering knowledge and rules that allegedly 
avoided the danger. Yet the car-jacking incident demonstrated how porous these boundaries could 
be, and how the boundaries and their enforcement themselves caused contention. Maintaining the 
modular fiction of Project versus non-Project and keeping the risks at bay was difficult even in the 
city-scape, where the security infrastructure was well developed, and where there was little need to 
interact directly with local stakeholders.  
 
The office as viewpoint: planning 
While HSS-measures produced enclaving and relied on the image of PNG as dangerous, the Project 
seemed to diverge from modular descriptions of extractive operations, when it came to planning. 
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Planning is often seen as a technology or technique of governance using rational-bureaucratic 
activities to arrange and distribute people and resources to enable positive intervention. As an 
activity, planning—at least in its origin—is then closely associated with the modernism discussed 
by Scott (Abram and Weszkalnys 2013). Planning was here also infused with discourses of CSR 
and implied a view of PNG’s population as different yet characterized by an underlying sameness 
that allowed them to be trained and included into the modern world of the Project. Despite the 
boundaries, management plans and several employees—local, national and international—thus held 
the expectation that the Project and its HSS-measures would play an important social role and 
benefit PNG with positive change (cf. Golub and Rhee 2013).  
By presenting expectations to development and change, the Project indicated a commitment to 
social thickness and local engagement. Various Project plans authored within the confines of office 
headquarters mentioned the positive impacts to be achieved in communities neighboring the 
Project. These plans were a response to PNG’s legislation on oil and gas extraction and to the 
aforementioned Equator Principles and International Finance Corporation demands. An important 
background to this is how the PNG legislation and PNG’s politicians accept and protect the 
authority and claims of customary rights to land. Customary landowners often prove vigilant and 
demanding in the face of resource or development projects. They are used to constantly renegotiate 
deals and expect to be embedded in project activities (Filer 1997; Weiner and Glaskin 2007). To 
appease legislation and landowners in particular, the Project had then agreed to source as many 
contractors and employees as possible from the PIAs. If the skills needed by the Project and the 
contractors were not found locally, it could source workers from other parts of PNG or 
internationally as the last resort. To facilitate this, the Project promised to fund training facilities for 
industry-relevant skills near the main extraction site as well as in Port Moresby. Here locals could 
be trained to leave their ‘undeveloped’ existence behind and become co-workers. 
Project management and planners also had visions for how to include locals and PNG nationals in 
the Project in other ways and for how to interact with local communities at the extraction site. One 
aspect of this was the plan to support and give contracts to local landowner corporations and 
businesses (see Jackson 2015), but it also concerned the trickle down of HSS-socialization. The 
management plan for community HSS exemplified the interrelationship between the Project and 
locals that was imagined prior to the construction phase. It stated among other things that Project 
employees who were sourced locally or from other parts of PNG could be peer educators in their 
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home communities and households and thus promote behaviors and practices positively affecting 
local safety and health. Project planners did not harbor the illusion of hermetic ‘internal project’ 
versus ‘external community’ categories, since the workforce was part of social relations extending 
beyond the Project perimeter. It was hoped, though, that such relations could be an advantage rather 
than a liability (Esso Highlands Limited 2013).6 HSS was in this perspective both a set of rules and 
directives that separated the enclave from its outside, and the means by which even the local 
outsider could develop and become ordered through education. People on the outside were in this 
view imagined not as dangerous but as characterized by an underlying sameness in their potential 
and desire to become ‘modern’. 
The ambition of developing PNG did not, however, imply an intention of taking over state 
responsibilities as educator and provider of services. It was rather evidence of the difficulty of 
disentangling the two views from each other in practice. Social engagement may be an alibi for 
extraction (Abram and Weszkalnys 2013: 8), or it can be a public relations performance of a 
project’s success in partnering with local communities and complying with CSR-expectations 
(Gardner 2016: 136). According to Muñoz and Burnham (2016), CSR may in practice thus promote 
enclaving even further. For example, notions of best practices can maintain enclaving through their 
control of the long and sometimes obscure supply chains that are found in the extractive industries. 
And while support for local businesses can be a stated ideal, CSR-systems control such business 
partnerships and disentangles the local from the equation through the enforcement of standards that 
are difficult to live up to. Partnering—for example by demanding that locals ‘help themselves’ or 
‘participate’—still requires partners to comply with best practices, which thus enables projects to 
disengage at any time from those relationships that prove difficult (Gardner 2016). The employment 
situation mentioned in the previous section is an example of how difficult this partnering and 
inclusion can be in practice when it has to be integrated with the practical exclusion perpetuated by 
HSS-measures: locals were included especially at the lower ranks of the Project, but the 
circumstances of boundary-traversing in particular meant that they were caught in a liminal space 
between inside and outside. CSR-based plans and initiatives may thus be a strategic resource 
allowing the extractive industries to abdicate responsibility and be detached from the sociality they 
claim to create.  
Planning with CSR, social thickness and similar demands from international financial organizations 
may then not challenge enclaving at all, and can analyzed as reinforcing modularity rather than as a 
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genuine commitment to engagement. Yet, the Project’s social initiatives were nonetheless planned 
and enacted with categories organized through modernist, bureaucratic means of classification. It 
was not only the local Papua New Guinean, who was a potential modern. It was also the Project’s 
practices of seeing, which exhibited modernism, when enclaving and HSS relied on standards 
stemming from developments in science, engineering and management disciplines in particular. The 
determination of Petroleum Development License Areas identified via GPS coordinates is an 
example of a scientifically based grid view rather than an enclaving view, when the coordinates 
determined who were included and thus eligible for royalties, compensation and benefits (Allen in 
Koim and Howes 2017). Contrary to what Ferguson seems to argue, preparing the ground for the 
flexible movement of capital may thus itself rely on standardization, homogenization and grid-
making in order to determine both engagement and detachment (e.g. who will receive benefits and 
who will not?).  
Apart from the GPS grids, several of the modernist techniques (e.g. standards for HSS) may not 
have been directly felt as an effect outside the enclave. Yet precisely such ways of seeing guided 
many practices on the inside. HSS was highly bureaucratized for example through the use of 
ExxonMobil’s Operations Integrity Management System, which is the corporation’s ‘sacrosanct 
text’ for responsible business conduct put into place in the wake of the Exxon Valdez (cf. Appel 
2012a; Muñoz and Burnham 2016: 153). Examples of this bureaucratization of accountability 
includes the need for gaining permissions for every work task, accounting for every possible threat 
to safety or security beforehand, and reporting standardized counts of ‘near misses’ or ‘lost time 
incidents’. The management plans and the digital platforms used to organize social engagements 
(stakeholder engagement in particular) also employed accounting formats to categorize, count and 
monitor impacted locals and their ‘issues’ as boxes to be ticked. These practices conceptually laid 
out both the order (or disorder), which was to be addressed, as well as the optimistic promises that 
the Project provided (cf. Abram and Weszkalnys 2013). The social engagement thus constructed 
simplified legible entities as Scott has stipulated (cf. Jorgensen 2007). This work of fortifying 
entities such as ‘landowners’ and ‘clans’ led by ‘chiefs’ relied upon assumptions that organized the 
local social world into manageable Excel sheets depicting persons as possessive individuals rather 
than as composite of relations (cf. Strathern 1988), and on groups as mutually competing but static 
assemblages of those individuals rather than as shifting and dynamic entities (cf. Gilberthorpe 
2013). Consequently, expatriate managers were surprised when local landowners would dispute and 
try to renegotiate agreements (which could be considered quite normal in PNG, cf. Filer 1997). 
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They considered such disputes to be a form of disorder, since the Project’s attempts at 
understanding why local employees or landowners acted as they did (e.g. in terms of explaining 
claims to land, work stoppages, requests for goods, absenteeism etc.) was obscured by references to 
chiefs or clan membership imagined as stable entities.7  
The practices of categorization and management integral to the Project’s way of seeing thus relied 
more on techniques associated with modernism than Ferguson’s and Appel’s focus on modularity 
and flexible capital seems to suggest. The social engagement could itself be conceived of as another 
technique for enclaving, but the Project did not hesitate to emphasize the grandness of its 
transformative and modernist potential either. It is tempting to compare the enclave to what Scott 
calls miniaturization—the making of a more easily controlled micro-order in a model community, 
when grand schemes are thwarted (1998: 4). At the very least, one should be cautious in seeing the 
two views (modularity and modernism) as mutually exclusive in extractive capitalist projects. They 
may co-exist and both be enacted under different circumstances, sometimes even through the same 
practices of ordering such as HSS (see Welker 2014).  
 
The camp as viewpoint: permeability 
Due to their remote locations, the sites of extraction should in theory be where the enclaving 
discussed by Ferguson and Appel was the most visible. The site I visited as part of my employment 
did indeed resemble an enclave, when approaching in a helicopter and seeing it from above. It 
consisted of a network of dispersed camps and construction sites located in what is today the Hela 
Province of the PNG Highlands. Travel to the enclave was via air straight to the Project camps 
surrounded by fences and with access controlled by security guards. The orderly Project sites 
constructed from metal, gravel and concrete were surrounded by mountainous bush and garden-land 
with scattered homesteads built from bush materials. The landscape provided a stark contrast to the 
Project sites, befitting narratives of civilization’s frontier. Once I was there, I noticed all the 
familiar signs, practices and procedures that were in place to enforce the enclaving—including 
modernist ways of counting and accounting for HSS-measures. However, these locations also 
turned out to be where boundaries were the most permeable. Despite the contrasts between camp 
and surroundings, the so-called enclave was in practice a mix of circumstances and techniques 
indicating the different and sometimes contrasting views. At least part of the reason for this was the 
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need for practical interaction with the outside. For example, the building of various infrastructures 
from telecommunication towers and roads to quarries and waste dumps required the Project to make 
agreements with several local landowners (for which we were allowed to go outside!). The need for 
movement between the dispersed sites comprising the Project enclave also created interfaces with 
multiple local social realities and made enclaving hard to maintain. In addition, contrary to the 
desire for HSS-based isolation, many employees had relations across the boundaries in ways that 
could not be delimited nor purified by HSS-measures. Consequently, there were several forms of 
entanglement that had to be negotiated.  
In this section I do not dwell as such on the HSS-requirements that saw PNG as risky and 
disorderly, or the planning that tried to see PNG as potentially modern. I focus instead on some of 
the spaces of contention between engagement and separation that became clear at the camp and the 
sites of extraction. This touches especially upon the locals who occupied liminal positions between 
Project inside and Project outside, but also the dilemmas emerging from attempts to simultaneously 
engage and disengage, include and exclude PNG. The zone-crossing employees in Port Moresby 
was but one instance of a phenomenon seen much more clearly at the extraction sites. 
At these sites, low- or unskilled positions such as drivers, cleaners, kitchen staff, guards or manual 
construction workers were usually filled by affected landowners, but the Project also benefitted 
from having people, who were local or at least could speak the local language (Huli) in positions 
with responsibility for community relations. There was also an essential office bestowed upon local 
representatives, namely the ‘village liaison officer’ (VLO), whose main task was to organize 
meetings between Project officers and local settlements and assist community affairs.   
The employment of people from neighboring settlements both gave the Project the feeling of an 
intimate relationship to the local communities, knowledge about local affairs, and generally a more 
relaxed interaction across the boundaries. It was also thought to give a security buffer, albeit it is 
unclear how well it worked. In sum, with VLOs and other local contacts as middlemen, the danger 
of the outside was not felt to be as comprehensive as one would think from the pervasive discourse 
of security.  
Despite these apparent advantages, local employees also provided significant dilemmas for the 
HSS-enforced boundaries at the extraction sites. Firstly, among the local employees were people, 
who seemed to pursue multiple agendas as landowners or even as local government representatives 
 16 
while also receiving Project salaries. Their loyalties towards the Project frequently appeared to be 
jeopardized by their social and kin-based relationships (cf. Imbun 2000). For example, community 
relations officers who were local landowners could be evaluating compensation claims staged by 
their kin or, conversely, their rivals.  
Secondly, while project managers did their best to employ the most qualified people, many 
landowners considered themselves entitled to work for the Project as a result of the agreement to 
employ locals. In some cases, refusing work to young local men (usually due to their lack of 
qualifications or understanding of HSS-demands) led to minor vandalism and occasionally 
blockades. Having locals inside as employees could correspondingly challenge security by enabling 
the smuggling of materials across the fence (e.g. food was given to locals outside, sometimes in 
return for sexual favors, drugs, or alcohol—all forbidden according to the Project’s closed camp 
policy). There were also accounts of minor theft of tools or work clothes, possibly as a result of 
Project staff failing to engage in exchanges with locals and thus ‘seeing’ them as they would like to 
be seen (cf. Strathern 1988; Minnegal and Dwyer 2017).  
Thirdly, as insiders with local ties could not easily be detached from the exchange relations they 
had with other locals, nor could they be detached from conflicts. I personally witnessed a situation, 
where one of our drivers was provoked by a young man with whom he had previously been 
involved in a dispute. What looked like an attack on a Project vehicle was more likely the 
continuation of another conflict now carried into a larger scene involving the Project. The new 
relations did not replace existing ones—they were instead enacted in a different form, where 
personal animosities or competition could be conflated with access to employment or other Project 
benefits. By this I do not intend to imply that the Project managers regarded its employees as pure 
individuals detached from any local context, when they donned their work gear and clocked in for 
work hours, but the complex interrelationships and loyalties of locally sourced labor did not always 
seem clear from the different Project viewpoints, which as mentioned addressed the local situation 
as one of ‘communities’ (in the management plans) led by ‘chiefs’ (in the expectations to whom 
one would have to settle disputes with).  
On a final note, the two different views also proved to exhibit conflicting temporalities of Project 
presence. Project management saw it as important to communicate that the Project would be present 
in the area for 30+ years. The modernist view predicated on partnership was thus one that 
temporally extended further than foreseeing and avoiding the next hazard or conflict. However, the 
 17 
long-term concerns were likely not shared by the many companies with fly-in fly-out expatriates 
subcontracted to oversee specific temporary parts of the construction. The HSS-backed 
circumstances of quick and temporary engagements, where there was little attention paid to 
exchanges with the local individuals or groups, provided the structure for the modular view that 
focused on avoiding danger now rather than one promoting HSS in the long-term (see Minnegal and 
Dwyer 2017: 239). At least the hoped-for trickle down of HSS-practices to locals did not seem to 
happen. Arguably, the Project presence generated more HSS-concerns than it solved for example 
due to the heavy influx of people and machinery into rural areas unaccustomed to such traffic. 
HSS-boundaries that could keep out PNG’s ‘disorder’ were impossible to erect and maintain in 
reality, and it was difficult to believe in the narratives of a Project separated from the outside, when 
witnessing the circumstances mentioned above. The modernist ideal of including PNG and aiding 
its development through planned and helpful interaction was equally a far cry from the actual 




Paying attention to how organizations ‘see’ infers an analysis of how they order and categorize the 
world, and how they act through those categories. One critical contribution of this article is to argue 
that seeing must be understood in relation to both the seeing subject and the object it sees, a point 
which is somewhat lacking in the otherwise inspiring works of Scott and Ferguson, where seeing 
implies a rather essentializing and totalizing vision. I have argued that the view(s) and the 
concomitant ordering actions of an organization may shape both its internal social dynamics as well 
as how it tries to engage—or disengage—its surroundings. Another contribution, following Welker 
among others, is the argument that given how extractive projects are organized as fluid and often 
temporary assemblages of multiple actors with different and even conflicting agendas, it may be 
misleading to assume that they see in just one way, or appear as coherent agents. Different views 
can co-exist and be difficult to keep separate in practice even if they in some ways are opposites. 
Acknowledging the multiplicities and contrasts of views can thus rather help us understand some of 
the social intricacies of the corporate organization of extraction.  
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On a larger frame, this analysis suggests that the theme of corporate organization of extraction can 
be interwoven with a theme of alterity; it focuses not only on how the corporation sees and enacts 
itself in different ways, but also on what it tries not to be (or see) when it finds itself in a foreign 
environment like ExxonMobil did in PNG. The Project’s response to alterity was to attempt to 
construct an enclave through strict health, safety and security measures, which in turn generated 
numerous complications and frustrations especially across the Project boundaries that were vaguer 
than the HSS-discourses wanted you to believe. An analysis that pays attention to such practices 
and discourses as ways of seeing can elucidate how it can be that a Project like the one analyzed 
here turned out far from the extractive capitalist dream of being the secluded enclave it hoped to be, 




The interpretations presented in this article are solely mine and do not represent those of the Project 
or the company through which I was hired. Nonetheless, my gratitude goes to colleagues there, and 
I hope my thoughts strike a chord with their experiences. I am also grateful for the insightful 
comments given by Andrea Behrends, Veronica Davidov, Martin Holbraad, Stuart Kirsch, Douglas 
Rogers, Timothy Sharp, James Weiner, Saulesh Yessenova, and three anonymous reviewers. 
 
Notes 
1. It should be noted that this article is not about ‘seeing in Melanesia’ but how an international 
corporation sees Melanesia. Thus, I do not engage the Melanesianist literature, which sees such 
corporations from the outside. Instead, I shift the ethnographic gaze to the views and practices of 
extractive industries. These are equally in need of analysis if one is to understand the interaction 
between them and their surroundings.  
2. One could add that where the mainstream perspectives assume ‘society’ (and the state) to exist as 
local perspectives on social relations, this could be questioned especially in a PNG context 
(Strathern 1988). 
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3. The Equator Principles (www.equator-principles.com) is a framework for financial institutions to 
determine and handle social and environmental issues in the financing of projects. They require 
borrowers to live up to relevant laws and standards, set up assessments, action plans and grievance 
mechanisms, engage in consultation and dialogue with relevant stakeholders, and accept 
independent audits and monitoring. 
4. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain in detail the complex dynamics of landownership 
in PNG, as it depends on localized relationships of both kinship and exchange. Landownership 
affects deals about local participation and the sharing of benefits, and a project’s access to land is 
never easily settled (Weiner 2005). One cannot assume that there are stable ‘groups’ or ‘clans’ that 
one can make deals with (Jorgensen 2007; Weiner 2005), and negotiations are often a fluid affair 
with competing actors expressing strong attachments to the land in question. 
5. Wantok (‘one talk’ in the lingua franca Tok Pisin) refers to the PNG way of expressing the social 
obligations that Westerners classify as the double bind of social security and corruption/nepotism. 
6. The plan currently accessible online is a revised version of the 2009 plan that I saw when I was 
employed, but the passages I refer to remain. By alluding to these plans I do not want to imply that 
every employee was aware of the overall planning and strategies, or that these were prioritized in 
actual communication with local stakeholders. 
7. Anthropologists knowing their classics would remember that the PNG Highlands are historically 
known for big men and other ‘manly’ leadership types, but not chiefs (Sahlins 1963). Employees 
with long-term PNG experience challenged this simplified idea of order/disorder by conveying 
understandings of the processes by which leadership and kinship were established locally, but to 
little avail from what I could gather. 
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